ARGENTINA WILL NOT PAY THE DEBT TO THE IMF

Within the State, the economic and political problems of the last default were manifested through a disciplined bureaucracy-like that of Dujovne and Sandleris, and an increasing indebtedness that became uncontrollable like that engineered by Prat Gay-Caputo.

The debt crisis weakened the economic order. Unemployment in 2001 went from 12% to 18%, before the social explosion, then to 25% and the inequality was already of a shocking magnitude. "Poverty is a consequence of inequality." This simple illustration of Charles Tilly is important when the issues of poverty and inequality are crossed again. Alain Touraine speaks of the inadequacy of representative democracies, weakened in societies. He believes that they have moved away from the governmental sphere with great social impact. He said: "We wanted democracy to be representative and it was good that it should be so; however, at present it is necessary to identify the interests that are representative and to ensure that the leaders are effectively representative, rather than of particular interests or of their own interest ".

It must be said that in this area our democracy has regressed. In just three years we have become a society dominated by financial interests and governed by neoliberalism policies. More and more sectors of the population are unprotected and marginalized.

If the extreme austerity of 2001 in Argentina was not the answer to the supposed fiscal problems, the recovery of the Argentine economy since the default did not take place as a consequence of those public policies but, precisely, because they were interrupted. However, it is possible to think that if the elements of 2001 were erroneous, there was not excessive fiscal expenditure or the size of the external debt and the fiscal deficit were not unmanageable problems.

Things have been different since 2003. Not only did all the indicators of the economy improve, but the debt with the IMF was completely canceled, more than 93% of the public debt was restructured by private holders and, during the entire period cited-on average-Argentina's country risk was lower than with the Macri administration, although it remained in default-considered that way, because of the outstanding debt with the holdouts.

However, a phenomenon of astounding political corruption is imputed to the period 2003-2015. What then seems to be is that if it is found that the previous administration was corrupt, there is little evidence that the new government, with elements of the private sector, has solved the problem?

The narrative of extravagant public spending that asphyxiated private activity was internalized-during the 1990s-as a certainty in citizenship and weakened the opposition policies of traditional and progressive parties. Is that at that time, the same technocrats who last week were with President Macri, inserted a fiction in the political sphere that was decisive in conditioning their strategic positions, through consciousness making consensus, to the point of manipulating the Congress to delegate extraordinary powers to a minister of economy (Domingo F. Cavallo). Today they have gone further; they have done it directly with the IMF, lending them an administrative assistant, euphemistically named Minister of Finance. That ability of local and foreign technocrats to "run to the right" to the government, to establish fears, pretending to legitimize a brutal adjustment, in such a way that the imperative need to establish the excessive austerity of social spending is indisputable, was a decisive instrument in the architecture of the stories that articulated the ideological and cultural hegemony of power in 2001.

The force acquired by the IMF in Argentina at that time, denatured and systematically distorted political and economic events, and intensified the path to default. It seems logical to think that, above fantasy, the reality of the last default should have been view before, but that did not happen-as today it is-until the financial crisis triggered the social outbreak of December 2001. After the crisis an alternative version to the neoliberal story emerged and it had been coherent and politically articulated.

The Argentina 2001 experience seemed to have shown that institutions do not reach when political representatives is delegitimized, and that is what is happening right now. Again we face an economic crisis (worsening of the recession), which can be more ruthlessly manifested in a financial crisis. Remember that flight to quality is not starting still, the country risk does not give way-even after a maxi depreciation and cession of control to the IMF-, the social crisis is growing (unemployment and poverty increases), there will be a correlative growth of the social protest and a predictable political crisis appears. As in the "Megacanje 2001" (Sturzenegger-Cavallo) that was carried out at a rate of 15% in dollars, the proponent of the re-negotiation is once again the IMF (yesterday mentioned by Lagarde) who appreciate the Argentine kindness of offering themselves periodically as a laboratory of essays. In the same way we see today, it is the IMF imposing the guidelines as Cavallo, in that plan called "Zero Deficit Rule", which committed the country to a policy of mystical austerity. At this moment, the slogan is zero primary deficits, to generate resources that pay the interest of the external private debt.

"Moral hazard"

This time, American plumbers are going to pay, as George Busch's ex-Secretary of the Treasury, Paul O'Neill said, leaving the consequences of "lending poorly" to be assumed by the IMF, not for the international private sector.

The IMF came to Argentina to have a client that pays the salaries and golf clubs of the bureaucracy and, also to assure the private banks. The banks will be rescue from their audacious exposure, "moral hazard". They knew that the possible negative consequences would not be assumed by them, but by the IMF.

History repeats itself

To recap, the Argentinean state ran out of funding from the voluntary markets as in October 2000 and, after turning to the IMF, was destroying an increasing proportion of the retirement funds, later (only a week ago) looting the Bank's coffers of the Argentinean. This was the case in 2001, after which was announced the suspension of payments on the public debt was whitewashed at the end of December (during the very brief presidency of Adolfo Rodríguez Saá).

The transfer of political power to technocracy and / or international finance has had a decisive impact on the Argentine crisis of 2001, basically by following the recommendations established by the IMF. It could be added an epiphenomenon that would support the idea that Argentine officials did not do enough to preserve local interests, as now, it could be that their decisions have coincided with the damage that the impositions of the neoliberal ideological biosphere will cause.

The displacement of partisan political power towards the corporate finances-managed three years ago by representatives of private corporations, foreign banks and the IMF later, the different forms and methodologies of violating the popular mandate through pressures to the country, at the risk of falling into social conflicts, the fact of applying this type of public policy has become a consequence.

Attempting to tie feets and hands to the next administration

A country that does not comply with the recommendations of the IMF has a series of implications that affect all areas of rights guarantees. In principle, the fact of being stripped of international credit, which cannot be completely dispensed with by any politically organized country.

The final result or the emerging situation post default 2001 and restructuring of the debt, ended up qualifying the country in a condition of "contempt" and a remaining soporific dispute with the "vulture funds". And unfortunately, we are on our way to repeating the story. Time is counted in weeks, maybe months.

I have already begun to work on a debt restructuring proposal, which in no way can be carried out without take off a percentage of the debt. If nobody said it, the IMF must knows that in order to moderate their level of exposure to the first default against to the IMF there is still time to avoid the disbursing 50% of the remaining package.